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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN B. CALAHAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
KAY LAUREL WOOD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11552 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has recited facts which she, or her At-
torney, hoped the jury would believe. However, con-
sidering the facts which the jury had a right to find, 
and did, they are as follows : 
In the early morning hour::; of December 6, 1966, a 
cold, ''very foggy" morning, the Plaintiff, a cocktail 
waitress at Chris' Tavern up Ogden Canyon, left her 
work and was being given a ride by a customer to Ogden. 
The car wouldn't start, and was pu::;hed down the canyon 
by a second car, about one mile, but without success. 
Both cars stopped, squarely in the center of the 
west bound lane, with the left side of the cars 1 foot 7 
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inches from the diYiding white line svparating the ea~t 
bound and \H'st bound lant>s. (T-3± - officer) There wer(· 
no lights on the can;. ( rr-85; T-88) rl'he of ficn, driving 
opposite bonnd h:v coincidvnce inmwcliately aftPr the ac-
cident sa\v no lights at all. ('L'-:29) 'l'he men in tlit• two 
vehicles had all alightl>cl from the cars 5 to 10 minutr·, 
befor0 the accident. ( '1'-GG) rrhey had no flashlighb. 
Tlwr0 was amplv room to park on the north should(·J, 
(T-89) and in fact, the officer parked hi:s car on the 
shoulder completely off the travel portion. ('r-30) 
The Plaintiff knew the car was blocking the road 
(T-GG); that it was fogg~-; that the :situation wa:s danger-
ous, but electPd to remain in the car becau:se she wa~ 
cold. (T-68) 
The Defendant, driving west dmrn tlw canyon at a 
speed of about 20 m.p.h. suddenly struck the unlighted ' 
vehicles, which he had not previou:sly :seen because of fog 
and darkness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DEFENSES OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE PROP-
ERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
\Ve reply to Appellant's Points One and 'l'!uee ' 
simultaneously. 
In Fergu:;un v:;. Ju·ng:;ma, 10 Ut. 2d, 179, 350 P21l 
404, this Court stated: 
"To evaluate tlw:se instructions a clear under-
standi~g of the difference between assumption of ' 
2 
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risk and contributory rn~gligence is necessary. 
'I'hese. terms are often used interchangeably; 
sometuues both are used when only one is ap-
plicable, and often the term assumption of risk 
is used when there is a total lack of evidence to 
support a finding that Plaintiff's recovery is bar-
red by that doctrine and under some fact situa-
tions both assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence would bar recovery. If the instruction 
is based on a factual situation which would sup-
port a finding of contributory negligence but the 
instruction erroneously called it assumption of 
risk, this alone would not be prejudicial error. 
Contributory negligence is based on careless-
ness, inadvertance and unintended events, but as-
smnption of risk requires an intelligent and de-
liberate choice to assume a known risk. Assump-
tion of risk requires knowledge by Plaintiff of a 
specific defect or dangerous condition caused by 
Defendant's negligence or lack of due care which 
Plaintiff could have, but voluntarily and deliber-
ately failed to avoid and thereby assumed the 
risk of the injuries he sustained. On the other 
hand, contributory negligence requires evidence 
only that Plaintiff failed to use the care for his 
own safety which an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person would use under the existing cir-
cumstances. 
Under both the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk, whether the Plain-
tiff failed to use due care for his own safety or 
he deliberately assumed the risk of injury in the 
face of known danger, was a jury question, unless 
the evidence was so conclusive on those questions 
that a finding otherwise would be unreasonable 
and so require a finding against Plaintiff as a 
matter of law." 
3 
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It was conkrnkd by Dd"emlant that Plaintiff 
(1) Assumed the risk of injnr:• to hen;('Jf h:· kn(J\I 
ingi_\' accepting a dangerous condition, which she could 
have aniided b:- the sirnplP act of !Paving tlw stow(·d 
car, and 
(2) That shl' \ms ('Ontrihutoril:· 1wglige11t for n11t 
t'XPrcising that d!•gn•e of care fur her ou:u safety that a 
rt>asonahle and prudent pen;on undl'l' thl' same circum-
stances would have exercised. 
In this respect, Plaintiff had am11lc time to object 
to the> driver parking the car in the traffic lane-wliiC'I: 
she did not. 
In Balle vs. Smith, 81Utah179, 17 P2d 22-1: 
"A guest is required to exl•rcise the same can 
for his own safety that a reasonable and prudent 
person would exercise under the same circum-
stances." 
In GOA C.J.S. Sec. 329 Motor Vehicles, Pg. 3G-l:, thl' 
text states: 
"The common-law duty to exercise reasonable 
and prudent care is not nullified by statutory reg-
ulations with respect to parking which are re-
garded as cumulative requirements, and thP fail-
ure to exercise such care may constitnk negli-
gence notwithstanding compliance with the rPf,rnla-
tions, since precautionary measures oth<'r tha 11 
those specified may sometimes be necessary. 
The test of negligPnce of a motorist parking 
or leaving his vehicle standing in the highway 1~ 
whether he exerC'ised i-mch care as a r<'asonabh 
prudent person would exercise in the same cir-
4 
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wm:-itances and it is not required that the driver 
shall have exercised extraordinary care. Ordinari-
1)·, the operator of the :-itovped vehicle has the 
right to assume that other vehicles using the high-
\rny \\·ill exercise reasonabl~ care in keeping a 
lookout and in passing; but it has been held that 
he may not assume, so as to shield himself from 
liability that another motorist would discover his 
negligt•11ce and by discovering, be able to avoid it, 
and, where existing conditions are such as to af-
frct vision it may not be assumed that an ap-
proaching vehicle will maintain its course on the 
left side of the highway." 
Jf tlten Uw drivt'r of Plaintiff's vehicle was negli-
gent in the manner and place he parked his unlighted 
car, would not the Plaintiff be negligent for acquiescing 
in that negligence without rn·otesU Would she be justi-
fiPd in a:-;:-;uming other motorists would discover the 
danger in time to avoid injury to her, when the driver 
would not he so justified~ 
Certainly Plaintiff's driver was negligent for vio-
lating the Provisions of 41-G-101, U.C.A. 1953 which 
states: 
"Upon any highway outside of a business or 
n·:-iidence district no person shall stop, park, or 
leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or 
unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part 
of the highway when it is practical to stop, park, 
or so leave :-ouch vehicle off such part of said high-
wa!·, bnt in every event an unobstructed width of 
the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be 
l<>ft for thP free passage of other vehicles and a 
dear viPw of such stopped vehick' shall be avail-
ab!P from a distance of 200 feet in each direction 
upon such hig·hway." 
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Plaintiff may not plead ignorance of the law, even 
though she was in fact, not the driver. 
However, aside from the statute, she knew the ear 
was parked without lights, blocking the only \Yest bound 
lane of a canyon road, in heavy fog. 'l'he car wa~ ~o 
parked for 5 to 10 minutes-ample time to object, to 
leave the car, and there was ample shoulder for the car 
to park on off the travel portion of the road, as did the 
Highway Patrol officer. 
61 C.J.S., Sec. 491, Pg. 116, Motor Y ehicles: 
"If an occupant of a motor vehicle knows, or 
in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that 
to remain in the vehicle is dangerous, and if under 
the same or similar circumstances a reasonably 
prudent person would leave or withdraw from 
the vehicle, he is guilty of contributory negligence, 
if, a reasonable opportunity therefore being of. 
forded, he fails to do so, and such failure con-
tributes proximately to cause his injury. 
See also Eserina vs. Overland J.lioving Co. (1949) 15 
Utah 519, 206 P2d 621. 
POINT TWO 
THE JURY DID NOT FIND THE ACCIDENT 
"UNAVOIDABLE" AND THE APPELLANT'S OB-
JECTION TO AN INSTRUCTION THEREON IS 
MOOT. 
The jury by Special Interrogatories found: 
(l) Defendant was IH'gligent for not keeping a 
proper lookout. 
6 
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(:2) 'L'he Plaintiff was contributory negligent for re-
maining in the vehicle nnder the circumstances. 
Obviousl,\r, th('refon•, tlwy did not find that the ac-
cident was uua voidable. 
rL'lw instrnctiun tlwreon could hardly be prejudicial, 
1•ren if \V(~ asstlllH' AIJ]Jellant conect in Point Two of her 
Brief. 
111 3 Am .. J ur. 2d, ~ee. ~03, Pg. 2-1 I, the text states: 
"The admission of erroneous evidence and 
erroneous instructions based thereon, are render-
ed harmless or cured where the jury verdict is 
sueh that the evidence becomes immaterial. And 
error in the admission of evidence is cured where 
the verdict shows that the evidence was rejected 
by the jury." 
See also Sec. 792. '---
/1£ y" c 7(/ 
Here, the jury ·1~ the defrnse of unavoidable 
accident. 
If we assmne the r:l'rial Court erred in allowing that 
--
. e--vtl cl) . defense, the error was ~1:Jy the verdict. 
It has long since been established in Utah that the 
erroneous admission of evidence on an issue found for 
the party comvlaining is harmless. 
Smith vs. (}ilbert, 49 Ut. 510, 164 P. 1026. 
Uarr vs. Cranney, 25 Utah 193, 70 P. 853. 
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See also 5A C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Sec. 1736. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney for Respondent-
Defendant 
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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